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INTRODUCTION
The right to life of the person and its various applications in
different political situations is one of the most debated subjects
of our day. This question is important today for a number of
reasons: the widespread demand for abortion, the drive for the
right to die, and the challenge to capital punishment. The
debate seems at times to be confused: those opposing all forms
of war and capital punishment seem to approve of abortion;
while others vehemently opposed to abortion, approve of war
and capital punishment. But this inconsistency disappears once
an absolute view of man's right to life is recognized. Under an
absolute view of man's right to life, capital punishment is never
justified.
This article hopefully contributes to the philosophical-moral
debate on the question of the human right to life. It first exam-
ines various international covenants and philosophical schools
and their ambiguous conceptualization of man's right to life.
The article, in the context of capital punishment, then develops
a theory of man's absolute right to life. The right to life is con-
sidered absolute because it is necessary to maintain two essen-
tial characteristics of man, his mystery and his priority-setting
ability. Because capital punishment denies these essential char-
acteristics, it is never justified.
I. THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO LIFE IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS AND PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS
Documents of various world-wide and multi-national
regional conferences and assemblies concerned with the human
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condition are ambivalent in their treatment of the problem of
when the life of a human being may be taken. These covenants
and conventions do not justify the right to life by any philosoph-
ical understanding of life, at least not explicitly. Some docu-
ments couple the phrase "right to life" with the term "inalien-
able," or with some other derived right. These documents seem
to be self-contradicting. They describe the right to life as
inalienable and then proceed to specify conditions allowing the
death penalty. In other words, although the documents speak of
the inalienable right to life, they permit the taking of human life
under certain circumstances and after certain legal procedures.
This contradiction results from a tension between the moral
principle of right to life and the right's application or underlying
policy' in various circumstances. A brief examination of some of
these documents demonstrates the tension between this moral
principle and the right's application.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and
proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in
1948 recognizes the right to life. Article 3 provides: "Everyone
has the right to life, liberty and security of person.' The Article
does not say that the right to life is inalienable; it says simply
that each person has such a political right, similar to that of the
American Declaration of Independence. It is a statement of a
general moral principle incorporated into a political document
binding those who belong to the UN. Yet, each nation is free to
apply its own meaning and interpretation of this general moral
principle by domestic legislation. Article 3 does not recognize an
absolute or inalienable right to life per se as distinct from other
types of rights.
In some United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO) documents preparatory to the
Universal Declaration, however, there was a statement attempt-
ing to establish the basis of the declaration by calling attention
to the right to life per se.8 These preparatory documents
1. A policy "sets out a goal to be reached, generally an improvement in some eco-
nomic, political, or social feature of the community"; a principle is a standard to be
observed because "it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of
morality." R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1978).
2. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
3. Human Rights: A Symposium, 268 UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC &
CULTURAL ORGANIZATION ED. (1949). However, this legislative history is ambiguous as to
the meaning of the right to life per se because exceptions are made.
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attempt to explain that the right to life is the foundation of all
other rights as well as the condition of their existence,' but they
do not demonstrate a jurisprudential or moral basis in any phil-
osophical concept of the person. As articulated in the UNESCO
preparatory documents, such a right to life is a dubious founda-
tion for all the other human rights because the right to life is not
demonstrated. If we cannot establish the right to life as founda-
tional, all other rights of the person flowing from the right to
life, are nonfoundational as well. The difficulty is establishing a
basis for the right to life. Of course, there is not universal con-
sensus on the meaning and importance of the person. It there-
fore comes as no surprise that these international documents did
not try to specify the foundation underlying man's right to life.
Yet, without a philosophical analysis of the concept "person," all
rights become the arbitrary giving or retaining by the covenant-
community, the State, even if by all states. For if the State may
define or give human rights, it may just as logically take them
away at some time in the future. Because these UNESCO docu-
ments fail to establish a philosophical foundation for man's right
to life, thus implying that the State has the right to define the
right to life, these documents are unsatisfying. Indeed, although
these documents represent a forward movement politically, they
are morally and philosophically dangerous.
Another document, The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,5 was submitted to the United Nations
General Assembly by the Economic and Social Council and
approved by a 106 to 0 vote in December, 1966. Its purpose was
to elaborate and make more specific the UN's Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights. Part III, article 6 of The International
Covenant specifies that "[e]very human being has the inherent
right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his life."' It is significant that the right
to life is to be protected by law, yet, the right finds its basis in
life itself, in the person himself. This is significant because the
foundation of this right resides in the person and not in the law;
the law only guarantees this right. But the term "inherent" is
not further developed. Thus in a period of twenty years, we may
note some significant progress in understanding the nature of
4. Id. at 267-68.
5. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
6. Id. (emphasis added).
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the right to life as well as other rights. Whereas The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights gave only the general moral
imperative of the human right to life, the International Cove-
nant places the source of the right to life in the human person
himself. The International Covenant does not confer the right
to life; under the Covenant, the right resides in the very nature
of the person.
The document goes on to say that the right to life cannot be
"arbitrarily" taken away and then specifies when life can and
cannot be taken. The document adopts an approach, similar to
due process analysis, to prevent a capricious or arbitrary taking
of human life without protection of law.7 Life can be taken for
serious crimes, but only according to proper procedures. But, the
document does not specify what constitutes serious crimes; it
leaves this task determination to individual countries and the
domestic law.
Another regional document, the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom,s was signed
in Rome in November, 1950, by the participant Western Euro-
pean nations, and entered into force September 3, 1953. Section
I, article 2 of the document provides:
(1) Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution
of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for
which this penalty is provided by law.
(2) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in con-
travention of this Article when it results from the use of force
7. The International Covenant provides:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of
death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the
law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the
provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention of the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can be carried out
pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commuta-
tion of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death
may be granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). Once
again, we are left philosophically dangling. The document places the foundation of the
right to life in the person and not, ultimately in the law.
8. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, [1974] Recueil des Trait~s (France) 28, 213 U.N.T.S. 272.
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which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defense of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of
a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or
insurrection.9
This article specifies that persons have a right to life but
does not explain or justify this right. It further elaborates that
life can be taken only for an action the domestic law of the
country labels as meriting the death penalty and only upon sen-
tencing by a court of proper jurisdiction. The article sets limits
restricting the taking of life, but assumes, once again, that
human life may be legally taken by public authority if certain
conditions are met..
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms recognized that an individual's right to
life, not an individual's life, is to be protected by law. This dis-
tinction is significant in determining whether a right is con-
ceived to be naturally an accompaniment of the person or
whether it is a stipulation of law constructed by society. The
difference is not minor. In the first case, the right to life would
inhere in the very person, whereas in the second case, the right
can be given as the State sees fit only if the State follows the
proper procedure. In other words, the distinction is whether the
right inheres in the very "nature" of the person or whether such
a right exists only as an appendage of positive law.
The last paragraphs of the article have yet to be inter-
preted, and thus raise a subsidiary question to the basic right to
life question: whether public authority can take life when it is
effecting any arrest or only arrests for a "grave offense," a direct
threat to human life. A simple reading of the text allows the tak-
ing of life in any arrest, for instance, even if a person refuses to
stop for a traffic violation.
Another document, the American Convention on Human
Rights, in article 410 recognizes, not the right to life, but the
9. Id. at 224.
10. Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides:
1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be
protected by law, and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it may be imposed
only for the most serious crimes and pursuant to a final judgment rendered by
19811
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right to have one's life respected and the document makes this
respect for life enforced by law. This is different from saying
that one has simply an inherent right to life. Respect is simply
esteem or opinion, a less essential quality than life. Life is a
quality in the very nature of the thing considered. The Ameri-
can Convention then states that no one shall arbitrarily be
deprived of his life. Once again, the supposition is that the only
right one has with regard to his life is the assurance that if the
State deems it advisable to take life, it must be done so in a
procedurally acceptable way, weakening the right considerably.
A nation may set up the most flimsy procedural due process, for
example, a military tribunal with very limited protection and
appeal, and still satisfy the Convention. If the right to life is not
considered inherent, the burden on the State to show a situation
when life may be taken could, conceivably, be slight. The State
could classify numerous behaviors as capital offenses (rape, kid-
napping, armed robbery, etc.). But, if the right to life inheres in
the person, the burden on the State seeking to deprive a person
of this right is very great. This burden would be met, if at all, in
only the most serious violations of social behavior (murder, trea-
son). In addition, an inherent right serves notice to the nation-
state that the right is of paramount importance, internationally
recognized, and that a State would be subject to international
disapproval if that right were not protected. Article 4 of the
document, nonetheless, fails to recognize the right to life as
inherent.
Article 4, however, makes more progress toward respecting
life than previously discussed documents. Article 4 does restrict
the taking of life to those within the ages of eighteen to seventy
a competent court and in accordance with a law establishing such punishment,
enacted prior to the commission of the crime. The application of such punish-
ment shall not be extended to crimes to which it does not presently apply.
3. The death penalty shall not be reestablished in states that have abolished it.
4. In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political offenses or
related common crimes.
5. Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the
crime was committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of age; nor
shall it be applied to pregnant women.
6. Every person condemned to death shall have the right to apply for amnesty,
pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be granted in all cases. Capital
punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition is pending decision by
the competent authority.
O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1, Jan. 7, 1970,
reprinted in 65 Am. J. INT'L L. 679. 680-81 (1971).
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years. Since the Convention is the first of its kind for many
nations, the only hope for passage of the document was to allow
each State broad discretion in defining crimes. Thus the abso-
lute bar against capital punishment was confined to narrow age
groups. For most persons the Convention guaranteed only some
form of due process before life could be taken. The article pro-
vides that nations that have abolished capital punishment shall
not reestablish it. Even the unborn generally are given some
right to protection under the Convention. But abortion could be
permitted under certain conditions. The very young and the old,
as well as pregnant women, are all protected. Moreover, capital
punishment may be imposed only for the most serious breach of
social behavior specified by domestic law. The document, in
other words, attempts to limit the extent of capital punishment
as much as possible under present international mores. This is a
step forward.
The United States Constitution is another example of a
document that assumes the State has the right and the moral
capacity to take the life of an individual human being. This view
is supported by the wording of the document, statements of
Supreme Court Justices, and United States Supreme Court
opinions. Until Furman v. Georgia" it was assumed to be con-
stitutional for each state to take human life after conviction of
certain crimes. In Furman, Chief Justice Burger correctly
observed that the plain language of the Constitution upheld this
power of the several states as well as that of the United States.1 2
The document's language seems to permit this taking of life
by the State. The fifth amendment says that a person cannot
"be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... ,18 The fourteenth amendment states that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... "14 The import of these- amendments
seems to be that the State may take the life of an individual
human being, if it is done with due process. 5
11. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
12. Id. at 380 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
13. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. "Due process" implies that punishment may not be "cruel and unusual" as pro-
scribed in the eighth amendment. Neither procedural nor substantive due process can
possibly be maintained in the face of capital punishment. The reason is disarmingly sim--
pie: the law may change at any time whereas the punishment inflicted is absolute and
irrevocable. Therefore, in the face of this absolute deprivation of the most fundamental
1981]
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In a dissenting opinion in Furman v. Georgia, Chief Justice
Burger cites the language of these amendments, permitting the
use of the death penalty, implying that these amendments give
the State the power to take life of the individual human being."
Within the context of that discussion, Mr. Justice Powell and
other dissenters in Furman cited Wilkerson v. Utah'7 and In re
Kemmler'8 as examples in which the Court held the State had
not violated either of the two amendments cited although the
State had executed individuals.'9
The Furman majority held that the State could not take an
individual's life because it would, given the unrestricted jury dis-
cretion in that case, constitute "cruel and unusual punishment,"
in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The right
of the State to take life, however, was not at all questioned by
of all legal nationalized rights (life), substantive due process can never be achieved no
matter how good the arguments for capital punishment might be. Once again, there can
be no exit from this problem without a philosophical analysis of the concept of human
person. All legal determinations will finally be dependent on this moral concept. Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), did not even attempt such an endeavor. One can see this
same solicitude on the part of the Supreme Court in its more recent cases concerning the
death penalty.
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), a divided Court concluded that the Georgia
legislature had successfully responded to the constitutional concerns in Furman. The
Court's plurality opinion found that the bifurcated proceeding established by the Geor-
gia statute suitably directed and limited the discretion of the sentencing body where the
state sought the death penalty. Id. at 196-206. The Georgia scheme narrows the class of
offenses for which capital punishment can be imposed by defining 10 "mitigating and
aggravating circumstances." GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1978). During the sentencing
phase, the jury determines whether any of the charged statutory aggravating circum-
stances apply, and whether to sentence the defendant to death. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-
2503(b) (1978).
The lead opinion in Gregg concluded:
In short, Georgia's new sentencing procedures require as a prerequisite to the
imposition of the death penalty, specific jury findings as to the circumstances
of the crime or the character of the defendant. Moreover, to guard further
against a situation comparable to that presented in Furman, the Supreme
Court of Georgia compares each death sentence with the sentences imposed on
similarly situated defendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particu-
lar case is not disproportionate. On their face these procedures seem to satisfy
the concerns of Furman. No longer should there be "no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not."
428 U.S. at 198.
16. 408 U.S. at 380 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
17. 99 U.S. 130 (1878). Wilkerson upheld the constitutionality of execution by
shooting.
18. 136 U.S. 436 (1890). Kemmler decided that death inflicted by electrocution is
constitutional.
19. 408 U.S. at 421-22 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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the majority of the Court and the case did not turn on that
point. The majority did not even contend that the taking of life
was "cruel and unusual," although this question was raised and
answered in the affirmative by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr.
Justice Marshall in separate dissents. Given the great diversity
in Furman (nine different opinions), it is difficult to imagine the
present Court declaring the death penalty unconstitutional per
se. In fact, the more recent decisions of the Court, particularly
Gregg v. Georgia2 0 and Godfrey v. Georgia,21 both held that the
death penalty was not per se "cruel and unusual punishment."
The concern in these cases was not the right of the State to
impose the death sentence but the due process necessary to
avoid "capricious and freakish" results in its application. If the
clause, "cruel and unusual" had not been in the Constitution
with reference to the imposition of punishment, one could won-
der if taking of individual life would still have been considered
unconstitutional even by a minority of the Court. The Supreme
Court decisions clearly support the view that the Constitution
allows capital punishment.
Further examination of these documents reveals a preoccu-
pation with rights of many kinds. Some rights are discussed in
terms of types of persons who possess them, such as women,
children, and minorities. Other rights are discussed in terms of
entitlements, such as work, speech, assembly, and income. Other
rights are categorized in terms of human, natural, legal, and
positive concepts.
The question might be asked, however, why these important
documents deal with the right to life, basic to the actualization
of all other human rights, in such an incomplete, haphazard, and
conditional manner regarding its moral-philosophical founda-
tion. Perhaps we have already touched on one possible answer.
Because legal systems depend upon a moral consensus to elabo-
rate and enforce rights, a concise and complete articulation of
the right to life is difficult to achieve. Additionally, the very con-
cept of "human rights" has evolved from the High Middle Ages,
through the Renaissance, the French and American Revolutions,
the 19th century Marxist and Humanist movements, to the pre-
sent. Each of these periods marked a stage in the evolution of
human rights. What is needed, then, is more emphasis on the
20. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
21. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
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very concept of "human rights" and how the right to life fits
more intimately into the whole scheme of human rights.
Leo Strauss suggests another answer, that the right to life
has always been considered to be self-evident, meaning that it is
so basic that it does not need philosophical and moral justifica-
tion or explanation.2 He mentions that those thinkers most
responsible for developing ideals of rights in modern thought
assumed the right to life to be self-evident and gave only mini-
mal consideration to the question in their treatises. None arti-
culated a philosophy of the right to life, but simply an under-
standing of life itself, encompassing all capacities of human
experience which could be used to argue against the taking of
life of an individual human being." On the other hand, current
practical documents have no philosophical basis. Because there
is a great diversity in the understanding of the human person,
one document satisfying the diversity of political systems, is and
was patently impossible. But an effort must be made to firmly
establish the foundation of the human right to life. As long as
this is not done, the right itself is in jeopardy.
II. WHAT ARE RIGHTS?
It is logical at this point to ask what "rights" are. This has
been the subject of much recent controversy."4 There is a great
amount of literature and thought available on this subject from
various philosophical schools.
In general, rights involve an ability to act free from coer-
cion. From another perspective, rights are transactional, imply-
ing an object to be satisfied. Rights, in other words, are always
"in relation to." Some philosophers define rights as those areas
in which a person is endowed with crying needs, which no one
may hear without acting. A right implies more than a claim to
dutified effort and implies success in the effort. 5
22. See L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT and HISTORY, 81-119 (1953).
23. See generally Wortley, Human Rights, 20 POL. Q. 135 (1949).
24. Perhaps the controversy continues in its pristine form in the great jurispruden-
tial debate in American and European circles through the book of R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). Dworkin states on the problem of rights: "Legal positivism
rejects the idea that legal rights can pre-exist any form of legislation; it rejects the idea,
that is, that individuals or groups can have rights in adjudication other than the rights
explicitly provided in the collection of explicit rules that compose the whole of a commu-
nity's Law."
Id. at xi.
25. For a discussion of natural rights see Wainwright, Natural Rights, 4 AM. PHnO-
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It seems, too, that some rights may or may not be consid-
ered alienable, with most philosophers saying that none are
inalienable in the sense that one must always have them met, 6
or the objects needed provided. Rights are therefore both inher-
ent and relational. That is, they may be exercised in relation to
and are limited by, the rights of others as well as the State inter-
est for the common good. Rights are considered to be condi-
tional. Society always has the prerogative to place conditions on
rights, even though they can be demanded without shame. The
implication is that society has the prerogative to determine
which rights, or at least the degree to which rights, can be
demanded without shame and which claims must be met. Hence,
there is in the philosophical literature, the same problem regard-
ing inalienability which exists in the enumeration of rights
found in international and regional documents. These philoso-
phers and documents never specify what rights are to be consid-
ered absolute.2 7 One suspects that for these authors and docu-
ments there are none, at least in the sense that there are no
rights so absolute that society may not regulate their exercise.
Recognizing the conditional nature of these rights, philoso-
phers acknowledge that priorities must be set when rights are
involved in allocating objects, and most say that priorities and
rights are correlated.2 Some philosophers, however, suggest
rights exist in objective human existence and nature, establish-
ing a source and structure for value priorities, without, however,
ranking or arranging rights and priorities.29 None of the philoso-
phers mentioned, however, justify man's right to life as inalien-
able. This is very serious, for if there is no consensus on this
question, then the drive to eliminate capital punishment from
the major juridical systems seems doomed to failure.
III. ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Insofar as capital punishment is the ordered and volitional
taking of human life by the organized state, it is morally wrong
SOPHICAL Q. 79 (1967).
26. See Frankena, Natural and Inalienable Rights, 64 PHiLOSOPHICAL REv. 212
(1955); Brown, Inalienable Rights, 64 PHILOSOPHicAL REv. 192 (1955).
27. See, e.g., T. GREEN, LECTURES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLMCAL OBLIGATION 154-
59 (1917 ed.).
28. Friedrich, Rights, Liberties and Freedoms: A Reappraisal, 57 AM. POL. Sci. REv.
841, 842 (1963).
29. See STRAuss, supra note 22.
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and violates the individual's absolute right to life. An absolute
right to life is essential to recognize the mysterious character of
life. Additionally, to prioritize other rights it is necessary to rec-
ognize man's rights to life as absolute. Capital punishment is
wrong because it becomes difficult if not impossible to recognize
the characteristics of man as mysterious and priority setting.
The first human characteristic capital punishment denies is
that human life is a totality which an individual can experience
as going on within and around him, in which he is involved, and
over which he has only limited control. Individual human beings
experience this totality when contemplating their own birth and
death. They do not know what, when, or if they were anything
before their birth, nor do they recall how or when they were
born, nor do they know precisely what will go on after they die.
This is the great mystery of human existence. In this sense, men
experience both knowing and not knowing some things about life
in terms of its beginning and end. One does not know when he
will die. Death is something that happens, coming from without,
and over which one has no real control. Death comes inexorably
but one does not know when or where. One might attempt to
control the beginning of another's conception through contra-
ceptive means, but even this is subject to error and calculations
fail. Hence, men are not fully in control of their own individual
lives either originally or finally. A person, even the most simple,
discovers his own existence. He contributes to his life's develop-
ment, and others help him in this, but he did not give himself
life. One cannot say that the State gave it, nor can one say that
his parents gave it. One recognizes that his life has so many
sources that he cannot specify them all, nor does he know them
all or their ramifications. In the face of such simple recognition,
one can only say that man is not totally responsible for the exis-
tence of his own life. Life is an accumulation of an unknowable
number of sources. Man's life, therefore, is not totally his and
cannot be taken by him for that reason; men cannot take their
own lives because life is a mystery from beginning to end. Simi-
larly, life does not belong to society and it is for that very reason
that the State cannot, in principle, take life.
To justify capital punishment for whatever reasons is to
deny that men experience life as a process over which they do
not have total control; it is also to say that men can and should
determine when life will end. Yet, when men acknowledge that
they are limited, fallible, and mortal they are acknowledging
[Vol. 5:23
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their limits before a mystery. To set up criteria for taking life is
to say that men know what life is and can define it by determin-
ing when human life should end. Man does not experience the
beginning and end of human life in this way. Indeed, he exper-
iences boundary situations where his capacity to know and act
are limited. Man's life is fundamentally a mystery. 0 Capital
punishment simply denies the givenness and totality of human
life; capital punishment also implies that men know more about
life than they do. Capital punishment is a denial of the human
mystery. Capital punishment is therefore always morally wrong,
no matter what the justifications.
It is often pointed out that when a group takes human life
on the basis of its lawful standards, as in capital punishment,
the dignity of human life is lessened. It is suggested that men in
society need a sense of the sacred. 1 The argument here suggests
capital punishment brutalizes life since capital punishment com-
pletely secularizes the concept of death, destroying life's mystery
by defining when life ends. By destroying mystery and the
sacred in society, capital punishment destroys the very purpose
for which human life exists, a never-ending search for human
meaning. No one has the right to frustrate this human dimen-
sion by imposing death. Capital punishment brutalizes not just
because we become used to the taking of human life, making it
easier to do in other situations, but, above all, because capital
punishment lessens our sense of the sacred and mystery to an
even greater degree than our technological society has already
done. Men feel that they can control and manipulate life if they
are presumed to have the right to define and therefore destroy
it. When man can completely control, calculate, and change life,
it is no longer considered sacred, since sacredness involves admi-
ration and wonder in its presence as well as an invitation to pon-
der and reflect. This is to say why and how capital punishment
brutalizes men and fosters vindictiveness among them. We can-
not morally destroy what we do not know or understand, and
the mystery of human existence by definition, is the ultimate
unknowable. Yet, as mentioned above, this mystery and sacred-
ness of human existence renders every act of capital punishment
morally wrong.
30. Some contemporary scientists describe life as a gift. Parsons, Fox & Lidz, The
"Gift of Life" and Its Reciprocation, 39 Soc. RESFCH 367 (1972).
31. See generally Parsons, supra note 31, at 385.
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The consequences of the brutalization caused by denial of
man's right to life are everywhere in modern society. There is
the paradox of a heightened consciousness of fundamental
human rights on a global basis and, at the same time, a thought-
less and feverish preparation for nuclear war which can com-
pletely destroy human life. Along with this modern conscious-
ness of human rights has come an unprecedented century of
wars, gas chambers, and internment camps which have brutally
taken the lives of hundreds of millions of innocent human
beings. Moreover, the world-wide phenomenon of the taking of
human life via abortion, infanticide, and eunthanasia is another
disturbing factor in this brutalization. Capital punishment is a
further addition to this universal brutalization of human life in
that it lessens our sense of mystery and the sacred. Indeed, the
ultimate protection of any human life is that it is esteemed by
individuals and by society. This sense of the sacred protects
human rights and human life which the laws presuppose but
cannot create.
Examination of the actions and crimes for which life may be
taken under current standards reveals that the taking is always
justified in terms of the actor's intent and conduct (mens rea,
actus reus). These actions always took place when an individual,
in some step-by-step process, pursued a goal over which he had
control, in the sense that he either could or could not have com-
mitted the acts. In other words, the moral dimension of a per-
son's action is always determinate for any capital offense. There
is always mention made of intention.82
Examination of legislation passed by state legislatures since
1972 reveals this to be the case. For example, a Montana statute
provides:
Aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circum-
stances are any of the following:
(1) The offense was deliberate homicide and was commit-
ted by a person serving a sentence of imprisonment in the state
prison.
(2) The offense was deliberate homicide and was commit-
ted by a defendant who had been previously convicted of
32. The actions for which death may be imposed include unlawful killing, homicide,
or murder, which vary slightly in definition but which can usually be encompassed under
the term "murder." The statutes defining the term always require a deliberate or willful
act. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13-1-70 (1975); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1980); GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-1101 (1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (1972).
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another deliberate homicide.
(3) The offense was deliberate homicide and was commit-
ted by means of torture.
(4) The offense was deliberate homicide and was commit-
ted by a person lying in wait or ambush.
(5) The offense was deliberate homicide and was commit-
ted as a part of a scheme or operation which, if completed,
would result in the death of more than one person.
(6) The offense was deliberate homicide as defined in sub-
section (1)(a) of 45-5-102, and the victim was a peace officer
killed while performing his duty.
(7) The offense was aggravated kidnapping which resulted
in the death of the victim.
Effect of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances. In determining whether to impose a sentence of
death or imprisonment, the court shall take into account the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances enumerated in 46-
18-303 and 46-18-304 and shall impose a sentence of death if it
finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances and finds
that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substan-
tial to call for leniency. 8
Man's intellect and will must be involved in some action and the
actor must plan some particular action (mens rea, actus reus). If
his mind and will are not involved and his action is simply the
result of pure emotion, if there is no thought involved, capital
punishment may not be invoked.
Recent legislation, enacted after Furman, carefully stipu-
lates that, when intent is absent in an action for which capital
punishment shall be imposed, capital punishment shall not be
sought. Such conditions or "mitigating" circumstances are set up
to exclude use of capital punishment because in such a case, it
would not be humane. When these circumstances so obstruct the
intellect and the will that these latter are not engaged, there can
be no truly human action and therefore there can exist no crime
worthy of capital punishment. For example, the Arkansas Code
provides:
Mitigating circumstances. -Mitigating circumstances
shall include, but are not limited to the following:
33. MONTANA RPv. CODES ANN. §§ 46-18-303, 305 (1979). Other examples can be
found in the following statutes: GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1977), ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-
1302 (1977).
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(1) the capital murder was committed while the defen-
dant was under extreme mental or emotional
disturbance;
(2) the capital murder was committed while the defen-
dant was acting under unusual pressures or influences, or
under the domination of another person;
(3) the capital murder was committed while the capacity
of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect,
intoxication or drug abuse;
(4) the youth of the defendant at the time of the commis-
sion of the capital murder; or
(5) the capital murder was committed by another person
and the defendant was an accomplice or his participation
relatively minor."
These statutes seem to indicate that the mind and will are in
some sense absolutely material to the case and subject to some
sort of objective verification. This is to say that the mind and
will are spiritual because the statutes assume that men can know
the mind and will and can observe them in specific actions, thus
enabling them to make a judgment as to culpability. Western
jurisprudence assumes individuals are responsible for their
actions and that it is up to the individual to show that, given
mitigating circumstances, he was not responsible for the act
committed.
The union of intellect and will permits the total integration
of individual human life and gives rise to man's capacity to act
in a human manner. Because imposition of capital punishment
requires considering the actor's mental process, when we deal
with actions specified for capital punishment, we deal with the
spiritual dimension of man in his very ability to act humanly.
Mind and spirit are presupposed for any action worthy of capital
punishment. Once again, we arrive at the mystery of person who
must be respected as a moral entity. The power of the group to
protect itself is without question. But the exercise of this power
to destroy freely and knowingly the spiritual and moral entity of
any one person, constitutes an ultra vires act by society. Such
an act is not the exercise of the moral power of the community
34. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1304 (1977).
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but the raw power of superior force."5 It is the ultimate affront
to the person.
That the exercise of capital punishment is immoral is also
demonstrated by the argument that capital punishment is justi-
fied because it deters crime. Capital punishment is, as we have
said, an affront to the human mind, will, and action (the human
mystery). It destroys all subsequent human actions, eating,
sleeping, loving, even hating, that could take place within a
prison cell. Outside of the revenge motive, the ends of society
are promoted by the continuation of this human mystery in a
jail cell, even for the rest of the person's natural life. The State
may not morally destroy this mysterious and sacred entity called
man, any man, voluntarily. Capital punishment supposes, there-
fore, that man is totally material and hence can be destroyed,
with little acknowledgement of the notion of spiritual self-fulfill-
ment, even eventual or possible self-improvement by remorse
and compassion. Capital punishment is immoral because it
denies that these characteristics of human life exist or that ame-
lioration of any spiritual person is always possible precisely
because he is spiritual. Capital punishment is therefore a capitu-
lation to human despair, the antithesis of morality and ethics.
In this respect capital punishment is like abortion and
euthanasia because it attempts to define life by "defining" its
limits, its beginning and end. Hence, man's claim of the power
to destroy these human and spiritual capacities in another
human person, justified on the basis of an assumption of the
power to define life, is a direct attack on life and the right to
life. Capital punishment is worse than either abortion or eutha-
nasia, because, unlike the latter, it is justified in terms of a voli-
tional act by the subject of the killing. Hence, capital punish-
ment is a more direct attack on the totality of human life
because it attacks the spiritual subject for what in fact he has
done.
Capital punishment involves more than taking life on
merely biological grounds, as in the case of abortion involving
arguments about biological factors such as physical condition or
35. It is significant that the group assumes it has the power to destroy mind and
will. This assumption can be seen insofar as it is a legislature which specifies the action
for which life will be taken and life can only be taken when mind and will are involved.
Substantiating the argument that the group assumes it has power to destroy mind and
will is much of the new legislation, requiring that a special group of men must hear the
case before a sentence of death can be carried out.
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development of the fetus, population pressures, and a pregnant
woman's physical and emotional health, or on emotional grounds
as in the case of euthanasia involving arguments concerning suf-
fering. Rather, capital punishment involves taking life because
of human action. Proponents of abortion and euthansia argue
that a life should not exist if it does not contribute to society,
causes unpleasant emotions, or is not biologically perfect, or if
there are too many people in a family or in the world. The pro-
ponents of abortion deny that these unborn entities are part of
human life. In abortion this fetus does not contribute to society
but causes severe emotional distress in the mother. Capital pun-
ishment makes the same judgment only on the basis of action.
The spiritual subject is put to death by the State because of his
actions.
One is allowed to live only based on the use he has made of
his mind and will. Not only must human life be defined in terms
of biology and emotion, but also in terms of spiritual action on
the part of the acting subject. In the case of capital punishment,
spiritual actions determine who lives and who dies. When we kill
a person for doing specified forbidden actions, we end all his
future spiritual possibilities and define his end by the imposition
of death. Again, herein lies the basic immorality of capital pun-
ishment. This is the consequence of objectifying man and saying
that he is subject to manipulation, indeed, the ultimate manipu-
lation of death by others. This is to give way completely to the
goals and values of technology, that men can use and define each
other for certain purposes as they use and define machines for
their own ends and change all of these ends for their own pur-
poses. If society is allowed to define the actions allowing imposi-
tion of the death penalty, it can do so on the basis of any
grounds whatever, or, at least define standards or priorities for
determining which actions are allowed to dictate such a result.
George Kateb aptly describes the moral repercussions resulting
when men are deemed to have the power to define life in terms
of action:
[T]he idea that you can make, manufacture, or fabricate peo-
ple, or plan in some precise way for their very being in all its
details, must lead to the idea that you can throw away what
you do not like, or what you think you have botched, or what
you may have made too many of, or what it would simply be
easier to do without. You do not need malignant intentions to
do such things; all you need is moral mediocrity expressing
[Vol. 5:23
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itself in bureaucratic euphemism and covering itself in neat
respectability.""
Abolition of the death penalty is necessary, therefore, not only
because the death penalty destroys an important element of
man's existence, life's mystery, but also because once death is
imposed as punishment for some actions, it can be imposed for
other actions, potentially in an arbitrary fashion.
Furthermore, the present standards for deciding whether
capital punishment is applicable, create other difficulties. First,
the standards, making fine distinctions, are difficult to apply.
Second, the harshness of the penalty imposed under the stan-
dards are not necessarily proportionate to the seriousness of the
action. Pennsylvania, for example, provides capital punishment
for murder.3 7 The code says that when murderers are convicted,
capital punishment is the mandatory sentence in the following
"aggravating" circumstances:
(1) The victim was a fireman, peace officer or public servant
(2) The defendant paid or was paid by another person or had
contracted to pay or be paid by another person ....
(3) The victim was being held by the defendant for ransom
(4) The death of the victim occurred while defendant was
engaged in the hijacking of an aircraft.
(5) The victim was a prosecution witness to a murder... and
was killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony ....
(6) The defendant committed a killing while in the perpetra-
tion of a felony.
(7) In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly
created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to
the victim of the offense.
(8) The offense was committed by means of torture.
(9) The defendant has a significant history of felony convic-
tions involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(10) The defendant has been convicted of another Federal or
State offense, committed either before or at the time of the
offense at issue, for which a sentence of life imprisonment or
death was imposable or the defendant was undergoing a sen-
tence of life imprisonment for any reason at the time of the
36. Kateb, The Next Stage of Nihilism, 40 Soc. REsEARCH 468, 477 (1973).
37. This argument is not to justify murder, of course, but to point out how contra-
dictory it is to say that murder, as a crime, merits capital punishment.
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commission of the offense.3
Almost all fifty states have passed similar statutes specifying
such aggravating circumstances to be determined in a bifurcated
trial. Such circumstances are difficult to determine in actual
practice. This simply creates a further difficulty of distinguish-
ing murder from homicide, similar to the difficulty in dist-
inguishing first and second-degree murder and manslaughter-a
traditional problem for criminologists.
As the Pennsylvania statute illustrates, to determine
whether capital punishment is imposed requires examining fac-
tors such as the identity of the victim. If the victim falls within
the statutory definition of fireman, capital punishment may be
appropriate. If the victim is not a fireman, and none of the other
specified conditions are met, then capital punishment could not
be imposed. The actor's conduct might be equally serious but
not trigger the death penalty. While the group defining capital
punishment defines life in terms of a certain action, it also
defines life in terms of conditions and circumstances surround-
ing the action such as murder in a "heinous, cruel, or depraved
manner" or if the victim is the President of the United States, a
foreign governmental official, a law enforcement officer, or a
fireman. Additionally, it is frequently said that society has the
right to take life if actions are judged to be "serious," "enor-
mous," "dangerous," "destructive," or "heinous" with little
thought given to the extent these are nebulous and ambiguous
concepts, always subject to arbitrary definition by judges. The
death penalty's arbitrary and disproportional administration
supports the prevention of the death penalty because it denies
the essentially mysterious character of man.
Another characteristic of human life that capital punish-
ment denies is that men are priority and value setting beings.
Each individual either sets priorities himself or someone does it
for him. In either case, such priority determination is a charac-
teristic necessary for human life. Capital punishment, however,
denies the necessity for priorities and that men are priority-set-
ting beings. If individual human life can be taken, it is not abso-
lute or inalienable; consequently, there is no ultimate foundation
or standard for setting priorities. That men do set priorities can
readily be seen in human experience. Men set priorities in order
38. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
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to provide necessities and preserve life in an environment of
scarce and limited resources. Usually, priorities are discussed in
terms of physical needs on the one hand, emotional and spiritual
needs on the other. All these values are necessary for human life,
but none can be satisfied in only one way. So priorities must be
set in terms of a scale of value or importance and the degree to
which this society can satisfy such needs.
There is ample evidence that men do set priorities. Harold
Lasswell says that men decide who gets what, where, when, how,
and why. 9 They must and do decide this based on what is most
important to them. There must be some ultimate value for mea-
suring other values. If this is removed, then we have a system
without direction or meaning. If there is no absolute value, we
are in the realm of utilitarianism or positivism, where there is no
inherent justification or foundation for human rights. If we say
that human life is an absolute that cannot be taken volitionally
even by the organized State, then we have such a firm basis.
Recognizing man's right to life as absolute is necessary for man
to properly set priorities. Of course, this does not mean that
society cannot defend itself against actions which are destructive
of innocent people; it may certainly do so, even in harsh terms,
but not by the imposition of death. Yet, even in emergency situ-
ations (self defense) the taking of human life is the lesser evil.
To advocate capital punishment and to say that a group has
the right to take human life, implying that the group has the
power, duty, or obligation to define human life, is really to deny
that men do in fact set priorities. It also denies that there is an
absolute standard underlying all human rights and consequent
valuables in terms of which allocation can take place.
Ethical theories suggest, and men in practical politics set,
priorities and allocate resources to provide objects of need. Law
rests behind all these needs. Men use values and a hierarchy of
values to justify or explain allocation. Men provide objects to
satisfy needs and rights are fulfilled in accordance with values.
The problem becomes one of finding the source or absolute
foundation of all of these rights and combining them into a
whole which can order the rest. In other words, the ultimate
value held as foundational, gives meaning and significance to all
the rest.40 If this ultimate value cannot be found, then the whole
39. H. LASSWELL, POLrIcs: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, How (1958 ed.).
40. See generally, Lederberg, Human Nature: A Reevaluation, 40 Soc. RESEARCH
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system is subject to arbitrariness. The argument must apply
above all to the foundational principle of human rights.
Only within the individual can the ultimate value be found.
If the individual's right to life is not assumed to be absolute,
then we have no foundational basis for allocating goods and ser-
vices and providing needs. Without an absolute right to life,
there will be no objective standard to rank priorities.
The totality of individual human life embraces biological,
social, and spiritual needs and capacities. It is above all else,
man's spiritual capacities, mind, "heart," and will, that integrate
the other human needs and the priorities necessary to allocate
them. That the group can define which action may result in
death suggests that the group is prior to life itself because it
defines it and the defining itself has no ultimate standard. If a
person does not have an absolute right to life, life itself becomes
an alternative priority, along with other priorities like food,
clothing, and shelter, which can be capriciously given or taken.
Life becomes something which is totally material in the minds of
men, a commodity to be allocated by the State. In this way, life
becomes "cheapened," and finally brutalized because it is placed
on the same level of other material needs of men; it becomes
brutalized above all by the organized society's denial that
human life, at its origins, continuum, and end, is fundamentally
a mystery. It is mystery which gives human existence dignity
and importance. Capital punishment violently and completely
denies this basic thesis, no matter how much "due process" is
employed in its execution. Philosophically, then, imposition of
capital punishment is never justified because it destroys funda-
mental characteristics of human life.
Traditionally, capital punishment has been justified by
more practical arguments. But even these practical arguments
do not support the death penalty. The traditional justification of
capital punishment is that the group may take the life of an
individual human being if rational criteria could be set up for
determining actions meriting execution, usually for the sake of
protecting the community, or even to channel the moral outrage
of the community in the face of certain heinous actions specified
by law. Basically, the criterion is that the group may take life if
it safeguards the common good.4 Capital punishment is consid-
375 (1973).
41. See, e.g., T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II, Q. 64, Art. 2. (1947 ed.).
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ered a deterrent to crime.4 Thus, it is argued, the group is pro-
tected from self-destruction and individuals are protected from
harmful action by capital punishment because capital punish-
ment deters criminal acts.
Statistics indicate, however, that capital punishment does
not deter crime." At the very least, there is great disagreement
among the experts about the deterrent effect of capital punish-
ment.44 The deterrence argument has never been proven. We
simply do not know how many would have killed if capital pun-
ishment did not exist. At the same time, the vast majority of
violent crimes are non-deliberate, that is, they proceed from the
heat and passion of the moment, where capital punishment does
not enter into the calculus of the crime. It is therefore difficult
to prove the deterrence argument one way or the other. This
argument, however, is irrelevant from a moral point of view for
the reasons we have already given. The negative moral impacts
of the death penalty are so serious, that capital punishment
should be foreclosed from a moral perspective in any event.
CONCLUSION
We have attempted to show that man's right to life is abso-
lute because man is thinking, spiritual, and mysterious. The
moral argument was made that since human life is a mystery in
its beginnings, its duration, and possibilities, as well as in its ces-
sation, its "definition" does not exist. We have also attempted to
show that unless this philosophical-moral stance is accepted as
the basis for the right to life, then there is no final measure for
any other human value or right. Imposition of capital punish-
ment denies these mysterious and priority-setting characteristics
42. We mention this argument, not because it goes to the heart of the problem, but
because it is so important in the pragmatic thinking of many of our contemporaries.
43. Homicide rates in retention states are two to three times that of abolitionist
states. E. SUTHERLAND AND D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY, 342 (10th ed. 1978). States that
have abolished the death penalty have experienced no unusual increase in homicide and
reintroduction of the death penalty has not been followed by a significant decrease in
homicide. Sellin, Effect of Repeal and Reintroduction of the Death Penalty on Homi-
cide Rates, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 339-74 (2d ed. 1968 H. Bedau). This data
was substantiated in a recent study. Bailey, Murder and the Death Penalty, 65 J. CraM.
L. & C., 416 (1974).
44. For example, researchers have reached contradictory conclusions concerning the
deterrent effect of the death penalty. See E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CON-
CERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION (1975); Symposium, Statistical Evidence on
the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 164 (1975).
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of man and, therefore, is never justified. Societies are built pre-
cisely on the value they place on human life. The foundation of
any State is always a philosophic-moral concept concerning the
fundamental right to life which cannot be evaded; and law's
underlying premise is always its view of the person and his right
to life.
